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TORTFEASORS IN ALASKA: A CALL FOR
COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal doctrines providing for the allocation of tort loss among
tortfeasors have been slow to develop in Alaska. The first major devel-
opment occurred in 1970 when the legislature enacted the Alaska Uni-
form Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (Contribution Act),'
which reversed the common law rule that barred courts from enforc-
ing contribution, or loss sharing, among joint tortfeasors.2 In 1975,
the Alaska Supreme Court adopted comparative negligence, 3 allowing
tort victims who were themselves negligent to recover damages from
concurrently negligent tortfeasors.4 Comparative negligence requires
the apportionment of fault between plaintiffs and defendants and holds
the defendants as a group liable for the percentage of the damage for
which they are responsible. 5 The enactment of the Contribution Act
and the adoption of comparative negligence were intended to provide a
system that attempts to match each tortfeasor's liability with his rela-
tive degree of fault.
Nonetheless, there is a fundamental inconsistency in the Alaska
system. In adopting the Contribution Act, Alaska's legislature
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1. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-.060 (1983).
2. See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
3. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975).
4. The old contributory negligence rule prohibited negligent plaintiffs from re-
covering from negligent defendants. See id. at 1047; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 463, 467 (1965); see, e.g., Bertram v. Harris, 423 P.2d 909, 914 & n.9
(Alaska 1967) (using the definition of contributory negligence found in RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965)); Odgen v. State, 395 P.2d 371, 372 (Alaska
1964) (contributory negligence barred recovery by negligent plaintiff).
The origin of contributory negligence is generally attributed to the case of Butter-
field v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). See Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1047. For a
good discussion of the common law development of contributory negligence in
Alaska, see Note, Comparative Negligence: A Time for Change in Alaska, 3 UCLA-
ALASKA L. REV. 103, 105-09 (1973). The author discusses the inequities inherent in
the contributory negligence rule and the judicial exceptions created to ease its harsh
application. Id. at 108-09; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A com-
ment a (1979).
5. Under "pure" comparative negligence, as adopted in Alaska, a negligent
plaintiff may collect damages reduced in proportion to his fault regardless of his rela-
tive degree of fault. Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1047.
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followed many other states by requiring contribution on a pro rata
basis.6 Each tortfeasor is required to pay an equal share of the dam-
ages, regardless of his degree of fault. The share is determined by di-
viding the amount of damages by the number of tortfeasors. 7 The pro
rata method was adopted partly because courts and juries were be-
lieved to be unwilling or incompetent to apportion fault among wrong-
doers. 8 The Alaska Supreme Court rejected this rationale, however,
when it adopted comparative negligence in 1975. The court found
that the state courts were capable of apportioning fault among wrong-
doers. 9 Since that time, the court has repeatedly noted the need for
the legislature to amend the Contribution Act to permit the courts to
apportion damages among tortfeasors according to their relative fault,
as they do between negligent plaintiffs and defendants under compara-
tive negligence.10
While urging legislative action on this issue, the court declined
two opportunities to circumvent the pro rata apportionment mecha-
nism established by the Contribution Act. In each case, the court was
asked to expand the doctrine of implied indemnity - a remedy that
allows one party to shift an entire damage award to another - to
permit negligent tortfeasors to use the doctrine. In Arctic Structures,
Inc. v. Wedmore, I' decided in 1979, the court refused to adopt implied
partial indemnity which allows courts to grant indemnity on a propor-
tionate fault basis. 12 The court did not discuss the doctrine in its opin-
ion, but noted that in order to bring the contribution system in line
with comparative negligence, the legislature, not the court, must re-
place the pro rata contribution system with a comparative contribu-
tion system. 13 In 1983, the court in Vertecs Corp. v. Reichhold
Chemicals, Inc. 14 considered, but ultimately rejected, the argument
that the doctrine of implied indemnity should apply in cases of concur-
rent negligence.
This note focuses on these recent decisions which demonstrate the
Alaska Supreme Court's hostility toward further judicial modification
6. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-.060 (1983); see Note, Adjusting Losses Among
Joint Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 964 (1959).
7. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.020 (1983).
8. See Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1048.
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., Criterion Ins. Co. v. Laitala, 658 P.2d 112, 118 n.ll (Alaska 1983);
State Mechanical, Inc. v. Liquid Air, Inc., 665 P.2d 15, 17 n.2 (Alaska 1983) (noting
that judicial expansion of the indemnity doctrine would abrogate existing contribution
statute); Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 435 n.29 (Alaska 1979);
State v. Guinn, 555 P.2d 530, 547 n.42 (Alaska 1976).
11. 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979).
12. Id. at 435 n.27.
13. Id. at 435 n.29.
14. 661 P.2d 619 (Alaska 1983).
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of the tort loss allocation system. First, the note traces the historical
development of the loss allocation system and summarizes the current
state of the law. Second, the note identifies some of the current issues
and unsolved problems in the field. Third, it analyzes alternative ap-
proaches to resolving the problems in light of the current law, and
offers a proposal for legislative reform by amendment of the Contribu-
tion Act. The proposed legislative amendment is modeled after the
1983 Uniform Comparative Fault Act, which is designed for jurisdic-
tions that have adopted comparative negligence. 15 The amendment
would replace the current pro rata contribution system with a system
that allocates contribution among joint tortfeasors on the basis of rela-
tive fault. Full indemnity would be reserved for cases of vicarious lia-
bility or prior contract.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF Loss ALLOCATION LAW
A. Early Development of Joint and Several Liability in England
and the United States
Historically, a great deal of confusion surrounded the develop-
ment of rules governing loss allocation among multiple tortfeasors. 16
The confusion was largely attributable to the failure of both courts and
legislatures to define terms and doctrines carefully and to their failure
to respond promptly and consistently to changes in the law.17 For
example, the meaning of the basic term "joint tortfeasors" has been
uncertain and inconsistent over the years.1 8 Joint tortfeasors under
the early common law were parties who acted intentionally or in con-
cert, with a common purpose to carry out a joint enterprise.19 The
plaintiff was permitted to sue any or all of the joint tortfeasors, who
could then be held jointly and severally liable for the entire loss. 20
Under the strict joinder rules, the plaintiff could join only those de-
fendants who had acted in concert. 21 Where defendants acted inde-
pendently, even though their acts combined to cause a single injury to
the plaintiff, the plaintiff was required to maintain a separate suit
against each defendant.22 As a result, separate trials produced ver-
dicts against each defendant for an amount presumably corresponding
15. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
16. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 46-51 (W.
Keeton ed. 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter referred to as PROSSER].
17. See id.
18. Id. § 46, at 322.
19. Id.; see Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979); PROSSER, supra note 16,
§ 46, at 322-23.
21. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 47, at 325.
22. Id. at 324-25.
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to his degree of fault.23 Thus, the system of assigning tort liability was
consistent with the system of procedural joinder.
The early American courts tended to follow the English rule of
joint and several liability among joint tortfeasors, although they grad-
ually permitted more flexible joinder rules.24 The enactment of the
New York Field Code of Procedure in 1848, followed by similar legis-
lation in most other states, substantially liberalized procedural rules.
The liberalized rules permitted the joinder of all parties necessary for a
complete resolution of the plaintiff's case, thus permitting the joinder
of concurrently negligent tortfeasors in a single action.25 Moreover,
joined tortfeasors were treated carelessly as joint tortfeasors, and were
held jointly and severally liable for the entire loss, even though they
had not acted in concert. 26 This liberal classification of joint
tortfeasors blurred the distinction between the procedural rule of per-
missive joinder of parties and the substantive doctrine of joint and sev-
eral liability of concurrently negligent tortfeasors for damages.27
Originally, when party joinder was permitted as a matter of conven-
ience, each defendant remained responsible only for his portion of the
damages based on his degree of fault.28 Over time, the courts came to
use the term "joint tortfeasor" to refer to all tortfeasors whose negli-
gence combined to produce a single injury, and each defendant was
held liable for the entire damage.29
The confusion .surrounding permissive joinder and joint liability
was intensified because American courts also required one verdict
when defendants were joined in a single action.30 The rationale for the
one-verdict rule was that, because joint tortfeasors had acted in con-
cert, the act of one was considered the act of all; therefore, the jury
was not permitted to apportion damages because the injury was neces-
sarily single and indivisible. 31 This rationale, however, was no longer
viable once the new procedural rules allowed joinder of defendants
without concerted action. Thus, the expansion of party joinder rules,
23. See id. at 328-29. This is essentially the definition of concurrent negligence.
See infra note 25.
24. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 47, at 325-26.
25. Id. Concurrently negligent tortfeasors are parties whose separate or unrelated
negligent acts combine to cause a single and indivisible injury to another party. See D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 149 (1973).
26. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 47, at 328-29.
27. Id. The purpose behind the joinder statutes was to provide convenience and
expediency, and to avoid multiplicity of suits, not to affect the substantive liability of
the parties. Id. at 327.
28. See id. at 329.
29. Id. at 328-29; see V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 252 (1974).
30. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 47, at 329.
31. Id. § 46, at 322-23, 325; see Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5a, 77 Eng.
Rep. 1150 (1613).
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the careless application of the term "joint tortfeasor" to refer to all
concurrently negligent tortfeasors, and the courts' adherence to strict
rules against dividing damages among defendants - all combined to
alter the substantive law of loss allocation.
B. Contribution
1. Early Development. Like the development of joint and several
liability, the early development of the contribution doctrine was
impeded by the application of traditional rules after their original
rationales no longer applied. For example, courts continued to apply
the common law rule that barred contribution among joint
tortfeasors 32 after the definition of "tort" was broadened to include
negligent acts. 33 At the time the rule denying contribution among
"tortfeasors" developed, the meaning of "tort" was limited to willful
or intentional wrongs. 34 The rule against contribution emerged as an
exception to the general rule that contribution was permitted among
negligent wrongdoers. 35 The rationale for the rule against contribu-
tion was that although courts would allow negligent parties to sue for
contribution, courts would not assist deliberate wrongdoers in settling
their disputes.36 Although the original rationale for denying contribu-
tion was "lost to sight,"'37 most American courts continued to deny
contribution among concurrently negligent tortfeasors until the mid-
1950's, even though English courts permitted contribution in cases of
vicarious liability, accident, mistake, or mere negligence. 38 Thus, the
judiciary's failure to evaluate clearly the meanings of "tort" and "joint
tortfeasor," as they were understood when the rule against contribu-
tion was developed, led many American courts to apply the rule inap-
propriately to cases of concurrently negligent tortfeasors.39
32. See, e.g., Vertecs Corp. v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 661 P.2d 619, 621 (Alaska
1983); see Comment, A Criticism of Judicially Adopted Comparative Partial Indemnity
as a Means of Circumventing Pro Rata Contribution Statutes, 47 J. AIR. L. & CoM.
117, 119 & n.6 (1981); see also PROSSER, supra note 16, § 50, at 336-37.
33. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 50, at 337.
34. See Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence
Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REv. 176, 178 (1898).
35. See id. at 177, 182-83. The original rule permitting contribution is generally
attributed to Battersey's Case, Winch's Rep. 48 (C.D. 1623). "The general rule is that
among persons jointly liable the law implies an assumpsit either for indemnity or con-
tribution and the [Merryweather v. Nixan] exception is that no assumpsit, either ex-
press or implied, will be enforced among wilful tort-feasors or wrongdoers." Reath,
supra note 34, at 177.
36. Reath, supra note 34, at 186-87 (quoting Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455
(1859) (Ellsworth, J.)).
37. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A comment a.
38. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 50, at 337.
39. See id.
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Nevertheless, the rule denying contribution was consistent with
the doctrine of contributory negligence.40 The doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence prohibited a plaintiff from recovering damages if his
negligence contributed to his own injury.41 The parallel between con-
tributory negligence and the rule against contribution is clear: just as
negligent plaintiffs could not recover against negligent defendants,
negligent defendants could not recover against other negligent defend-
ants.42 Together, the two doctrines barred negligent parties from re-
covering against other parties.
In practice, the rule against contribution permitted faultless
plaintiffs to determine who would bear the loss for their injuries be-
cause defendants could not compel other tortfeasors to share the bur-
den. Persistent criticism of the rule against contribution and
recognition of its "obvious lack of sense and justice" led many state
legislatures and courts to provide for contribution among joint
tortfeasors.43 Most of the reforms were statutory enactments based on
40. The endurance of contributory negligence is discussed in Note, supra note 4,
at 108. The lengthy history of the rule against contribution is discussed in RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A comment a.
41. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1046-47 (Alaska 1975).
42. The similarity of rationale and operation between the rule against contribu-
tion and contributory negligence is discussed in Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity
Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130, 132 (1932).
43. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 50, at 337. The persistent criticisms of contribu-
tory negligence by legal scholars and the judiciary are summarized in Note, supra note
4, at 103-04 & nn.5-12. The author suggests that "early acceptance of the rule was
undoubtedly [influenced by] the desire to protect developing industry, particularly the
hazardous yet essential railroads, from unlimited liability in the tort field." Id. at 107.
The long retention of contributory negligence "may ultimately be attributed to the
principle of stare decisis or to legislative neglect." Id. at 108 (footnote omitted); see
also Williams & Davidson, Kaatz v. State: The Rule of Comparative Negligence Afloat
Upon Uncharted Alaskan Waters, 6 UCLA-ALAKA L. REv. 175, 175-76 (1977) (not-
ing the opposition of the insurance industry to adopting comparative negligence).
The status of contribution rules in American jurisdictions as of 1959 is sum-
marized in Note, supra note 6, at 981-82 app. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-
.060 (1983); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-77 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231B,
§§ 1-4 (Michie/Law Co-op 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1B-1 to -6 (1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-11-101 to -106 (1980).
These statutes, except California's, were modeled after the 1955 version of the Uni-
form Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and provide for pro rata contribution. 12
U.L.A. 63 (1975).
The 1939 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act requires
contribution according to each tortfeasor's relative degree of fault. 9 U.L.A. 230
(1957). Many states have adopted relative fault statutes. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-1002(4) (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6302(d) (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.31(3)(a) (West Supp. 1984); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 663-12 (1976); S.D. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 15-8-15 (1984); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §§ 1, 2
(Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40(2) (1977). Several other states'
comparative contribution statutes are listed in Comment, Comparative Contribution:
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the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act.44
2. Alaska's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act. Alaska's Contribution Act 45 was passed in 1970 to "avoid the
injustice often resulting under the common law."'46 At that time, the
doctrine of contributory negligence was still recognized in Alaska;47
courts and juries were considered by many to be incompetent to ap-
portion damages accurately or efficiently among wrongdoers. 48 There-
fore, Alaska's Contribution Act, like most contribution acts, 49 limited
contribution to pro rata shares.50 Alaska's Act creates a right of con-
tribution in favor of one tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro
rata share5' and does not permit consideration of the relative fault of
the tortfeasors in determining the appropriate loss allocation. 52
The drafters of Alaska's Contribution Act avoided several proce-
dural restrictions that created problems in other states.53 Alaska's
statute does not require that a joint judgment be rendered against
The Legislative Enactment of the Skinner Doctrine, 14 J.MAR. L. REv. 173, 183 n.61
(1980).
44. The original Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was approved in
1939 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association. 9 U.L.A. 230 (1957). Few states adopted it, and those
that did amended it extensively. The lack of uniformity prompted the withdrawal of
the old Act and its replacement in 1955 with a new one designed to avoid many of the
procedural issues that had created problems in many states. 12 U.L.A. 57, 59-60
(1975); PROSSER, supra note 16, § 50, at 338 n.20.
45. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-.060 (1983).
46. Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 430 n.8 (Alaska 1979)
(quoting the House Judiciary Committee Report, 1970 House Journal 437).
47. Arctic Structures, 605 P.2d at 430.
48. See Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1048.
49. See generally Note, supra note 6.
50. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.020 (1983). The legislature did consider appor-
tioning contribution according to relative degrees of fault when it considered the Con-
tribution Act in 1970. The Judiciary Committee of the Alaska House of
Representatives reported that:
The Judiciary Committee amendment would require each tortfeasor's share
of the liability to be based on his relative degree of fault. After a review of
the official comments accompanying the uniform Act and of the relevant
pages of the transcript of the meeting of the national conference's committee
which wrote this Act, the Judiciary Committee is unconvinced of the need to
prohibit the degrees of fault from being considered (as is done in the original
version).
Arctic Structures, 605 P.2d at 430 n. 13. Without explanation, and despite the recom-
mendation of the House Judiciary Committee, the legislature enacted the pro rata
mechanism.
51. ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010(b) (1983).
52. Id. § 09.16.020(2).
53. See generally Fischer, The New Settlement Statute: Its History and Effect, 40
J. Mo. B. 13 (1984).
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multiple tortfeasors before the right to contribution arises. 54 Thus, if a
plaintiff is unable or unwilling to sue some of the individuals who are
allegedly responsible for his injuries, the named defendant may join
other tortfeasors or sue them separately for contribution. The Contri-
bution Act also permits a tortfeasor to bring a claim for contribution
even without satisfying the entire judgment, as long as the claimant
has paid, or may have to pay, more than his pro rata share. 55
In addition, Alaska's Contribution Act creates an incentive for
settlement. A tortfeasor who settles with the plaintiff in good faith is
released from further liability for contribution to non-settling
tortfeasors.5 6 If a settling party negotiates a release for other
tortfeasors, the settlement reduces the amount of the plaintiff's claim
against non-settling, non-released tortfeasors by the amount of the set-
tlement or by any amount stipulated in the release, whichever is
greater. The settling party may then sue the released tortfeasors for
contribution.5 7
Significantly, Alaska's Contribution Act "does not impair any
right [of] indemnity under existing law." s58 As discussed more fully
below, the traditional form of indemnity is the common law equitable
doctrine that shifts the entire burden of tort loss from one defendant to
another. Alaska's Contribution Act makes it clear that contribution
and indemnity are mutually exclusive remedies, yet it does not attempt
to define or limit the law of indemnity in Alaska.59 The Contribution
Act also does not indicate when courts should apply indemnity instead
of contribution, apparently leaving that determination to the courts.
C. Indemnity
1. Early Development. In multiple tortfeasor cases, damages may
be allocated among the tortfeasors by way of either contribution or
indemnity. The right to indemnity was recognized at early common
54. ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.030(a) (1983).
55. See id. § 09.16.010(a).
56. Id. § 09.16.040(2); see Vertecs Corp. v. Fiberchem, Inc., 669 P.2d 958, 960-61
(Alaska 1983) (a settlement prompted by desire to avoid liability for contribution not
necessarily in bad faith; settlement upheld).
57. ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.040(1) (1983). But see infra note 154, discussing Cri-
terion Ins. Co. v. Laitala, 658 P.2d 112 (Alaska 1983).
58. Id. § 09.16.010(f).
59. Even though "one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right
of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity
obligor is not entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of the indem-
nity obligation." Id. In Industrial Risk Insurers v. Creole Prod. Servs., Inc., 568 F.
Supp. 1323, 1328 (D. Alaska 1983), the federal district court noted that the Alaska
Supreme Court has never "expressly identified the elements of a claim for implied
indemnity."
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law.60 In its traditional form, indemnity allows a party to shift the
entire liability for an injury from one tortfeasor to another. 61 In con-
trast, contribution permits one tortfeasor to compel another to share
the liability, either on an equal or on a percentage basis. The right to
indemnity may arise in several ways. For example, it may arise con-
tractually, either expressly or by implication.62 Indemnity may also
arise "by operation of law to prevent a result which is regarded as
unjust or unsatisfactory. ' 63 This is called implied or equitable indem-
nity. While the enforcement of contractual indemnity is justified by
the express or implied agreement of the parties, 64 the enforcement of
implied indemnity is based upon "a legal fiction founded not upon the
parties' intent, express or implied, but upon justice, equity and the
doctrine of unjust enrichment. '65 The remainder of this note focuses
on implied, rather than contractual, indemnity.
Under early common law, the right to implied indemnity was
narrowly defined.66 Generally, courts implied an obligation to indem-
nify a tortfeasor only when there was a pre-existing relationship be-
tween the parties. 67 For example, an employer held vicariously liable
for the tort of a servant or an independent contractor was entitled to
indemnity from the "active tortfeasor" - the party who directly
caused the injury.68 Similarly, the right to implied indemnity was rec-
ognized for "an innocent partner or carrier held liable for the acts of
another, or the owner of an automobile for the conduct of the
driver."' 69 Generally, the courts required an indemnitee to be innocent
of any wrongdoing and exposed to liability only through the indemni-
tor's acts; in other words, the indemnitor was treated as having
breached "his obligation not to expose the indemnitee to liability."'70
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B comment a (1979).
61. See PROSSER, supra note 16, § 51, at 341.
62. Id.
63. Id. Common law equitable or implied indemnity is a specific remedy available
to a party who has paid or may have to pay an obligation for which another party was
primarily liable. D. DOBBS, supra note 25, at 135.
64. See Ferrini, The Evolution from Indemnity to Contribution - A Question of
the Future, If Any, of Indemnity, 59 CHI. B. REc. 254, 255 (1978). This note is con-
cerned primarily with implied indemnity; the law governing express and implied-in-
fact indemnity contracts is discussed occasionally by way of contrast.
65. Id. The primary rationale for the doctrine of implied indemnity is said to be
the aversion to unjust enrichment. "[O]ne who has been compelled in discharging his
own legal obligation to pay off a claim which in fairness and good conscience should
be paid by another can secure reimbursement from that other." Leflar, supra note 42,
at 147.
66. Ferrini, supra note 64, at 254.
67. Id. at 255.
68. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 51, at 341-42.
69. Id.
70. Ferrini, supra note 64, at 255.
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Over time, many courts expanded the doctrine of implied indem-
nity beyond its traditional limits. In response to the unavailability of
contribution, even a negligent defendant was held to be entitled to
indemnity, as long as the claimant was the less negligent party.7' In
the process, the courts developed various tests to determine whether
the entire loss should be shifted from the passive or secondary
tortfeasor to the active or primary tortfeasor.72 For example, a passive
tortfeasor might be a retailer who relies on a manufacturer's duty to
guard against product defects, or a municipality that relies on a con-
struction company to repair and maintain its streets.73 The original
significance of the active-passive distinction faded as courts expanded
the doctrine to allow indemnity in favor of the less culpable of two or
more negligent parties. 74 Because each court based its decision on eq-
uitable principles, the limits of implied indemnity became elusive and
unpredictable. 75 As a result, it became "extremely difficult to state
any general rule or principle as to when indemnity will be allowed and
when it will not."176
71. See Vertecs, 661 P.2d at 621; Leflar, supra note 42, at 154-58. Professor Le-
flar, after summarizing the three areas of tort (non-contractual) indemnity already
well-rooted in the common law when he wrote in 1932, described an additional body
of cases using the active-passive negligence test to allow indemnity where the parties
were not in pari delicto. Id. at 155. He criticized this approach for its uncertainty and
lack of standards. He also described the cases in this field as granting indemnity only
"to one whose only negligence was a failure to discover and remedy a dangerous con-
dition formerly created by the misconduct of the one against whom indemnity is
given." Id. at 156.
Since 1932, the courts using the active-passive and other tests have broadened the
field to include any fact pattern where, for example, "there was a qualitative distinc-
tion between [the] relative culpability [of the parties]." Ferrini, supra note 64, at 257
(discussing Illinois law). Ferrini suggests that, incredible as it may seem, one "who is
49 percent negligent may obtain full indemnification from one who is 51 percent negli-
gent. . . .Yet this was the natural and perhaps unavoidable consequence of the pro-
hibition against contribution." Id.
72. The three primary tests have been described as (1) the active-passive test;
(2) the primary-secondary test; and (3) the duty-no duty test. Other tests include
misfeasance-nonfeasance and omission-commission tests, serving "basically the same
function - to distinguish grades of fault." Comment, Indemnity and Third-Party
Tort Actions in South Dakota, 21 S.D.L. REV. 393, 400-401 (1976) (citations omitted);
see generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943, 950-89 (1969 & Supp. 1984) (listing states
applying the active-passive and other tests in various factual settings).
73. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 51, at 342-43.
74. Ferrini, supra note 64, at 256 (quoting Bua, Third Party Practice in Illinois:
Express and Implied Indemnity, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 287, 296 (1976)).
75. See Ferrini, supra note 64, at 256; see generally Leflar, supra note 42, at 154-
58 (discussing the vagueness already apparent by 1932).
76. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 51, at 343.
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2. Implied Indemnity in Alaska. In addition to recognizing con-
tractual indemnity,7" the Alaska Supreme Court has occasionally dis-
cussed implied indemnity, and has allowed it in its traditional form as
a means of shifting liability from a party who "is sued vicariously for
the negligence of the indemnitor .... -78 In 1981, the Alaska
Supreme Court implied in dicta 79 that it might go beyond this tradi-
tional limit. The implication was that in addition to recognizing im-
plied indemnity for vicarious liability, implied indemnity among
concurrently negligent tortfeasors might be recognized in Alaska:
Three broad possible fact patterns can arise in the indemnity
setting: (1) the indemnitee is sued vicariously for the negligence of
77. For examples of contractual indemnity cases in Alaska, see City of Juneau v.
Alaska Elec. Light & Power Co., 622 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1981); Amoco Prod. Co. v.
W.C. Church Welding & Contracting Inc., 580 P.2d 697 (Alaska 1978); Manson-
Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1976).
The importance of carefully drafting contractual indemnity clauses is likely to
increase after Vertecs, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 101-26. A good
example of a potential problem is an indemnity provision that serves to hold another
party harmless for injuries for which the indemnitor is to some degree at fault. In
Industrial Risk Insurers v. Creole Prod. Servs., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1323, 1329-30 (D.
Alaska 1983), Creole had contracted with the Alyeska Pipeline Company to be in
charge of starting up Alyeska's pump stations, and their contract included a provision
whereby Creole would indemnify Alyeska for harm caused, in any degree, by Creole's
negligence. Fluor Engineers and Constructors, Inc. had designed the pump stations.
Alyeska sued Creole for indemnity under their contract after Alyeska had paid for
injuries incurred in pipeline construction. Creole and Alyeska settled, but because
Fluor was not released by the settlement agreement, Creole could not obtain contribu-
tion from Fluor.
The federal district court held that although the Alaska Supreme Court had
never ruled on the issue, its previous decisions restricting implied indemnity in Arctic
Structures and Vertecs demonstrated that the Alaska court would probably require
Creole to prove its actual liability to Alyeska in order to prove that Fluor was under a
legal obligation to indemnify Creole. Thus, in order to prove its liability to Alyeska,
Creole had to prove its own negligence. The federal court noted the irony of the result
but held that, under Vertecs, Creole would have to prove itself out of court - it it
were negligent in any degree, implied indemnity would be unavailable.
78. See, e.g., Austin v. Fulton Ins. Co., 498 P.2d 702, 705 (Alaska 1972) (insurer
held vicariously liable for negligence of its agent); Kastner v. Toombs, 611 P.2d 62, 65
(Alaska 1980) (rules of indemnity apply where a master is held liable for his borrowed
servant). The Alaska Supreme Court has neither adopted the definition of common
law indemnity set out in the Restatement of Restitution, Section 76, nor expressly
identified the standards it will apply. Creole Production Services, 568 F. Supp. at 1328.
The federal district court in Creole Production Services assumed that the Alaska appel-
late courts would recognize the "essential elements of common law indemnity":
The indemnity claimant must plead and prove that (1) he has discharged a
legal obligation owed to a third party; (2) the defendant was also liable to the
third party; and (3) as between the claimant and the defendant, the obliga-
tion ought to be discharged by the latter.
Id.
79. Alaska Elec. Light & Power Co., 622 P.2d at 957.
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the indemnitor, (2) the indemnitee and indemnitor are concurrently
negligent, but, because there exists a joint and several liability, only
one party is sued, or (3) the indemnitee is solely negligent and the
indemnitor is, by agreement, liable.80
The Alaska Supreme Court did not rule on the second fact pattern,
however, because the case involved contractual indemnity.81 Two
years later, all doubts were resolved against implied indemnity among
concurrently negligent tortfeasors when the court held in Vertecs Corp.
v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., that "public policy dictates that Alaska
should not adopt implied indemnity between concurrently negligent
tortfeasors. ' ' s2
The following discussion analyzes two recent cases in which the
Alaska Supreme Court rejected opportunities to modernize Alaska's
tort loss allocation system. This analysis is necessary to understand
the current issues and problems in this area.
a. Arctic Structure , Inc. v. Wedmore: No Implied Partial Indem-
nity Among Concurrently Negligent Tortfeasors. Implied partial in-
demnity is a judicial doctrine that some courts use to allow partial loss
shifting despite the traditional rule that indemnity is a total loss shift-
ing mechanism. 83 In 1979, the Alaska Supreme Court, without discus-
sion, declined the opportunity to adopt the partial indemnity doctrine
in Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore.84 The petitioners in Arctic
Structures argued that, because the court had rejected all the reasons
for avoiding judicial apportionment of damages between plaintiff and
defendant according to relative fault when it adopted comparative
negligence, judicial apportionment of damages among multiple de-
fendants according to relative fault should be permitted. 5 The peti-
tioners contended that the rule of joint and several liability should be
modified to assign percentages of fault among the defendants; this
would be in harmony with the changed approach to tort loss alloca-
tion indicated by the new comparative negligence rule. In addition,
the modification would further the Contribution Act's fundamental
80. Id. (emphasis added). The argument that the court had recognized implied
indemnity among concurrently negligent tortfeasors in Alaska Elec. Light & Power Co.
was raised in Vertecs. See Vertecs, 661 P.2d at 622.
81. Alaska Elec. Light & Power Co., 622 P.2d at 957.
82. 661 P.2d 619, 626 (Alaska 1983). The court in Vertecs expressly noted that its
comment in Alaska Elec. Light & Power Co. merely described fact patterns and in no
way recognized implied indemnity among concurrently negligent tortfeasors. Id. at
622.
83. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n, Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578,
578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) (discussing and applying the doctrine).
84. 605 P.2d 426, 435 n.27 (Alaska 1979).
85. Id. at 429, 431.
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purpose of equitable loss apportionment.8 6 The court refused to con-
travene the language of the Contribution Act and apportion fault
among concurrently negligent tortfeasors. 87
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected petitioners' arguments pri-
marily because the court believed it would have to abolish joint and
several liability and therefore "cast the total risk of uncollectability
upon the injured plaintiff."'8 8 In reaching its decision, the court relied
heavily on the language of the Contribution Act, the limited legislative
history of the statute, and the comments of the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws regarding the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act - the model for Alaska's Act.8 9 According to the
court, the statute's direction that "principles of equity applicable to
contribution generally shall apply" in determining tortfeasors' pro rata
shares was intended "to govern contribution when one defendant is
found to be insolvent, and [not] . . . to affect the requirement that
relative degrees of fault are not to be considered as a factor in the
apportionment." 90 The court also noted that the rule of joint and sev-
eral liability had been retained in the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act 91 and in both California92 and Florida,93 where comparative negli-
gence and pro rata contribution coexisted.
The California Supreme Court, however, retained joint and sev-
eral liability even though it had adopted the doctrine of implied partial
indemnity.94 In other words, although California courts may ignore
the state's pro rata contribution statute for purposes of assigning per-
centages of fault, each tortfeasor remains jointly liable for the entire
amount of the damages. California's method of using both joint and
several liability and implied partial indemnity was designed partly to
accommodate the same concern voiced by the Alaska Supreme Court:
to protect plaintiffs from bearing the entire risk of uncollectability. 95
Nevertheless, in Arctic Structures the Alaska Supreme Court rejected
the doctrine of implied partial indemnity without discussing its merits
or viability. 96
As Justice Boochever pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Arc-
tic Structures, joint and several liability can coexist with relative-fault
86. Id. at 431.
87. Id. at 430-32.
88. Id. at 431.
89. Id. at 430-32.
90. Id. at 430-31.
91. Id. at 431-32.
92. Id. at 433-35 (discussing primarily American Motorcycle Ass'n).
93. Id. at 432-33 (discussing Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973)).
94. See American Motorcycle Ass'n, 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal.
Rptr. at 188-89.
95. See id. at 589-90, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
96. 605 P.2d at 435 n.27.
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contribution or indemnity. He argued that joint and several liability
should be retained, and losses among defendants should be allocated
in accordance with their relative degrees of fault.97 Justice Boochever
reasoned that such a scheme would be consistent both with earlier pre-
cedent in Alaska98 and with the Contribution Act's purpose and
language. 99 Thus, he asserted, despite the -pro rata language of the
Contribution Act, "the reason for dividing liability equally no longer
exists."10o
b. Vertecs Corp. v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.: No Implied Indem-
nity Among Concurrently Negligent Tortfeasors. The most recent de-
velopment in Alaska's loss allocation system was the decision in
Vertecs Corp. v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. 0 1 In Vertecs, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the right to implied indemnity does not exist
among concurrently negligent tortfeasors.10 2 The following analysis of
the Vertecs decision introduces some of the issues and problems
presented by legislative inactivity in this field of law.
In 1970, Vertecs Corporation (Vertecs) was hired to install poly-
urethane foam insulation in a cold storage plant under construction
for the City of Yakutat. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. (Reichhold) sup-
plied some of the foam that Vertecs used to insulate the building. a03
In 1977, a fire destroyed the cold storage plant, and the foam insula-
tion supplied by Reichhold allegedly aggravated the fire damage. The
City of Yakutat and the plant's former tenant brought an action
against Vertecs and Reichhold, 104 alleging liability under eight theo-
ries including negligence. Reichhold settled with both plaintiffs in
March 1981 and obtained a release. Subsequently, the action against
Reichhold was dismissed with prejudice.105
In March 1981, Vertecs filed a cross-claim against Reichhold for
either contribution or indemnity, alleging that any negligence on its
part was merely "passive," whereas Reichhold's negligence was "ac-
tive."' 1 6 The superior court ruled that "Alaska law did not provide
97. Id. at 440-41.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 441.
100. Id.
101. 661 P.2d 619 (Alaska 1983).
102. Id. at 626.
103. Id. at 620.
104. On May 11, 1979, the plaintiffs brought actions against fifteen parties, includ-
ing Vertecs and Reichhold, in their amended complaint. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The superior court granted summary judgment to Reichhold on the con-
tribution claim "since Reichhold had settled in good faith with the plaintiffs." Id. at
621.
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for indemnity between concurrently negligent tortfeasors. Since only
fault-based claims had been alleged against Vertecs ... it could not
obtain indemnity .... ,,lO7
On appeal, the Vertecs case gave the Alaska Supreme Court the
opportunity to adopt or reject the implied indemnity doctrine for con-
currently negligent tortfeasors. The court reviewed the historic devel-
opment of contribution and indemnity10 8 and considered several
aspects of the implied indemnity doctrine advanced by Vertecs. 0 9
The court concluded that public policy required denial of implied in-
demnity for tortfeasors who are negligent in any degree.110
The court identified three advantages that might result from al-
lowing implied indemnity in favor of tortfeasors whose relative fault is
slight.111 The first was stated by the court as follows:
The most fundamental argument in favor of indemnity between two
concurrently negligent tortfeasors is that of fairness. Even if two
tortfeasors are held jointly and severally liable, often one will pay
the entire judgment. If that tortfeasor bears only a minor degree of
fault, it is indeed grating to contemplate that it may well shoulder
the entire loss while the tortfeasor bearing a large degree of fault
suffers none. 12
The second advantage mentioned by the court in support of implied
indemnity was that it would more accurately match the liability of
each tortfeasor with his degree of fault. The court noted, however,
that under the traditional doctrine of implied indemnity, the entire loss
shifts to the more blameworthy tortfeasor, which is not in complete
accord with the underlying tort principle of relative fault. 113 The third
advantage noted by the court was that "loss-shifting via indemnity
may well serve the modem tort goal of shifting losses in a socially
desirable fashion so that the loss is most efficiently spread throughout
society."114
107. Id. at 620.
108. See id. at 621.
109. See id. at 623-26.
110. Id. at 626.
111. See id. at 623-24.
112. Id. (footnote omitted).
113. Id. at 624. The court did not discuss the doctrine of implied partial indemnity
which it had previously rejected in a footnote in Arctic Structures, 605 P.2d at 435
n.27.
114. Vertecs, 661 P.2d at 624. The court suggested that if the indemnitor were
insured, or were "a governmental entity, then the loss may be diffused among the large
population of policy-holders, customers, or taxpayers." Id. (citation omitted). Never-
theless, local retailers may not be good loss-bearers, even for a pro rata share, because
they may be underinsured and thus forced to pass their loss directly on to retail
customers.
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Despite the court's recognition of the advantages of allowing im-
plied indemnity, the countervailing arguments persuaded the court
that the doctrine should not be available to negligent parties. 1 5 The
court was understandably concerned with the vagueness of the doc-
trine.1 6 It would be difficult to determine which cases of concurrent
negligence would justify implied indemnity in favor of one party." 17
Vague and confusing judicial standards would result." 8 A prolifera-
tion of indemnity actions in multiparty lawsuits would burden trial
courts with "a bewildering array of issues."' "19 Furthermore, adopting
the implied indemnity doctrine would disrupt the current scheme of
incentives. In some cases, the deterrent of potential liability would be
sacrificed, 20 and the incentive for potential indemnitors to settle
would be lost because there would be no guarantee of a complete re-
lease from liability as long as another tortfeasor might sue for implied
indemnity. 121 Finally, the court was strongly influenced by the exist-
ence of Alaska's Contribution Act, which demonstrated the legisla-
ture's "considered policy judgment . . . that concurrently negligent
tortfeasors should share equally in the loss caused by their tortious
acts." 22 In sum, the court believed that implied indemnity among
115. See id. at 624-26.
116. Id. at 624.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 624 (quoting Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367
(Minn. 1977)).
120. Id. at 625. The deterrence argument is weak for at least two reasons. First,
many tort cases based on fault involve no moral culpability, and second, where the
tortfeasor is insured, the only deterrent is the indirect cost of higher insurance premi-
ums. Cf D. DOBBS, supra note 25, at 586-87 (discussing deterrence in a different
context).
121. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.020 (1983); see also Vertecs, 661 P.2d at 625. The
court explained that while a tortfeasor who settles with the injured party would be
discharged from liability for contribution under Alaska Statutes section 09.16.040(2),
the tortfeasor would still be liable for indemnity under Alaska Statutes section
09.16.010(0. Vertecs, 661 P.2d at 625.
122. Vertecs, 661 P.2d at 625 (footnote omitted). The court in Vertecs also stated
that "two distinguished commentators have concluded that once a state adopts contri-
bution, that should be the sole method of non-contractual loss-shifting among concur-
rently negligent tortfeasors." Id. (footnote omitted). One of these commentators,
Dean Keeton, acknowledged that his view was not consistent with the majority of
scholars at that time. "Contrary to the views of most of my legal education col-
leagues, I have never believed that it was practical or feasible to compare faults other
than in a general way, such as through the recklessness and negligence concepts."
Keeton, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 27 INS. COONS. J. 630, 633
(1960). The other commentator, Professor Leflar, wrote in 1932 that "[i]ndemnity
between tortfeasors serves a good purpose when as between them substantially the
whole of the fault was in the one against whom indemnity was given. Roughly, that is
the area within which it is now permitted." Leflar, supra note 42, at 159.
It is arguable that contribution should be the sole remedy only when it is compar-
ative contribution, as opposed to pro rata. Thus, the greater liability would be placed
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concurrently negligent tortfeasors should not be recognized. 123
The breadth of the Vertecs rule is demonstrated by the subsequent
disposition of Vertecs's indemnity claims that were not based on negli-
gence.124  On remand, the superior court relied on the Supreme
Court's earlier decision in Vertecs, which broadly declared that any
degree of negligence by a tortfeasor barred implied indemnity.1 25 The
superior court held that if the claimant were negligent in any degree,
even nonnegligence claims labeled "breach of warranty" or "strict lia-
bility" would be barred as merely restated, and impermissible, indem-
nity claims.126
upon the more blameworthy tortfeasor, and the need for implied indemnity would be
greatly reduced. The court in Vertecs noted that the Alaska legislature chose the pro
rata scheme over a relative fault amendment proposed by the House Judiciary Com-
mittee. 661 P.2d at 625. The court recognized the shortcomings of the pro rata
method, but felt that the legislature had already decided the issue against comparative
loss shifting among tortfeasors. This left two wooden alternatives: pro rata contribu-
tion and total loss shifting under implied indemnity. The court concluded that, given
pro rata contribution, no modem function remained for implied indemnity among
concurrently negligent tortfeasors, despite the unfairness of pro rata contribution in
some cases. Id. at 626.
123. Id. at 625-26. Two months after Vertecs, the court clarified its postion on this
issue. "To the extent that an expansion of the common law of indemnity would over-
lap into and judicially abrogate portions of the contribution act, we are reluctant to
create such an expansion." State Mechanical, Inc. v. Liquid Air, Inc., 665 P.2d 15, 17
n.2 (Alaska 1983). In State Mechanical, the court applied the Vertecs rule "that no
claim for non-contractual implied indemnity [lies] between concurrently negligent
tortfeasors" to affirm a superior court decision precluding an indemnity claim by a
negligent contractor against a manufacturer of a defective product. State Mechanical,
665 P.2d at 17.
124. See Vertecs, 671 P.2d at 1275 (outlining the complex series of procedural
events in the Vertecs litigation). Vertecs had filed breach of express and implied war-
ranty and strict liability counter-claims against Reichhold in July 1982. Reichhold
challenged Vertecs's right to amend its answer on the theory that res judicata barred
Vertecs's nonnegligence indemnity claims. The superior court dismissed Vertecs's
cross-claims and third party claims, but the Alaska Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded to the superior court to decide the merits of the nonnegligence theories. Id. at
1275, 1277. In May 1984, the superior court granted summary judgment in favor of
Reichhold against Vertecs' nonnegligence indemnity claims. See City of Yakutat v.
Witco Chem. Corp., No. 3AN-79-1134 Civ. (Alaska Super. Ct., May 24, 1984).
125. Witco Chem. Corp. at 11, 13-14.
126. Id. at 15-18. The Alaska Supreme Court had previously held that attorney's
fees, costs, and interest could not be recovered in an indemnity action unless the
claimant were free of personal fault. See D.G. Shelter Prod. Co. v. Moduline Indus.,
Inc., 684 P.2d 839, 841 n.5 (Alaska 1984).
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III. CURRENT ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN ALASKA'S PRO RATA
ALLOCATION SYSTEM
A. Alaska's Contribution Act and Legislative Intent
In evaluating the degree of reliance the Alaska Supreme Court
has placed on the policy decisions embodied in the Contribution Act,
it is helpful to examine the legislative intent underlying the statute.
The Alaska legislature passed the Contribution Act to relieve the
harshness of the common law doctrine that barred contribution
among joint tortfeasors. 127 The Act was passed to ensure that each
joint tortfeasor would pay his fair share of the damages rather than
have one tortfeasor bear the entire loss. 128 At the time the Contribu-
tion Act was passed, loss allocation on a comparative fault basis was
considered judicially and administratively unworkable and
inaccurate.a29
The pro rata Contribution Act represented a great improvement
over the common law rule barring all contribution. Nevertheless,
whether the Alaska legislature intended the Contribution Act to pre-
clude the future development of implied indemnity remains unclear.
The language of the Contribution Act arguably demonstrates an intent
to leave the development of the doctrine of indemnity to the judiciary
by providing in part:
This chapter does not impair any right [ofj indemnity under existing
law. If one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the
right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution,
and the indemnity obligor is not entitled to contribution from the
obligee for any portion of his indemnity obligation.' 30
On one hand, the troublesome phrase "under existing law" supports
the proposition that the legislature intended to preclude judicial ex-
pansion of implied indemnity to include negligent tortfeasors because
127. See Criterion Ins. Co. v. Laitala, 658 P.2d 112, 115-16 (Alaska 1983) (quoting
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT, HousE JOURNAL OF 1970, at 437); see also City
of Juneau v. Alaska Elec. Light & Power Co., 622 P.2d 954, 959 (Alaska 1981); Arctic
Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 430 n.8 (Alaska 1979) (quoting at length
the report in 1970 HOUSE JOURNAL 437). The court in Alaska Elec. Light & Power
Co. noted that the House Judiciary Committee Report on the bill stated that one
purpose of the proposed legislation was to "avoid the injustice often resulting under
the common law," due to the no contribution rule. 622 P.2d at 959 n.15 (quoting
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT, HOUSE JOURNAL OF 1970, at 437).
128. Laitala, 658 P.2d at 115. The court in Laitala discussed the purpose of the
Contribution Act when it determined whether a post-judgment settlement agreement
satisfied the judgment so as to extinguish all the tortfeasors' liability to the plaintiff,
and, if so, whether a right of contribution existed among the tortfeasors under Alaska
Statutes sections 09.16.010(a),(d) and -.030(e) (1983). 658 P.2d at 115; see supra note
154.
129. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Alaska 1975).
130. ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010(f) (1983).
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this form of implied indemnity did not exist in Alaska when the stat-
ute was drafted.131 On the other hand, perhaps the phrase indicates
that the legislature wanted to give the courts the freedom to provide
common law indemnity and to expand or contract the common law
equitable doctrine as fairness and justice might require.1 32
If the Alaska legislature did not intend to freeze judicial develop-
ment of implied indemnity, how far can or should the courts expand
the doctrine? The Contribution Act does not specify acceptable forms
of indemnity. As noted above, 13 3 other states have allowed implied
indemnity in favor of tortfeasors who are only slightly at fault against
those who are greatly at fault because it is more equitable than enforc-
ing the statutory remedy - a fifty percent split. Nonetheless, the
Alaska Supreme Court apparently concluded that the legislature in-
tended the Contribution Act to preclude implied indemnity even for
tortfeasors whose relative fault was only slight.134
The California Supreme Court interpreted a similar statute,
which preserved indemnity "under existing law," to permit the expan-
sion of California's implied indemnity doctrine to encompass implied
partial indemnity.135 The California court reasoned that the legisla-
ture could not have foreseen that equitable considerations would jus-
tify judicial creation of the doctrine.' 36 The California legislature
131. But cf Alaska Elec. Light & Power Co., 622 P.2d at 959 n.17 (Contribution
Act does not impair parties' right to agree, in good faith, on an alternative loss alloca-
tion formula).
132. The argument against interpreting the legislative intent behind the passage of
a contribution statute as to provide contribution as "the sole permissible remedy" is
made in O'Donnell, Implied Indemnity in Modern Tort Litigation: The Case for a
Public Policy Analysis, 6 SETON HALL L. REv. 268, 284 n.40 (1974-75). See also
Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IOWA L.
REv. 517, 518 n.9 (1952).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
134. See Vertecs, 661 P.2d at 621.
135. American Motorcycle Ass'n, Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 602, 578
P.2d 899, 914-15, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 197 (1978). In American Motorcycle Ass'n, the
California Supreme Court relied upon the decision in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30
N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), in which the New York Court
of Appeals created a right of implied partial indemnity despite the existence of a pro
rata contribution statute. "In authorizing equally shared contribution among tort-
feasors jointly found liable, this statute [CPLR § 1401, repealed in 1974] did not con-
template an apportionment already made in the judgment, and the joint responsibility
described was not one of indemnity." Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at
391. California's contribution statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 876(a) (West 1980),
provides that "the pro rata share of each tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be deter-
mined by dividing the entire judgment equally among all of them."
136. American Motorcycle Ass'n, 20 Cal. 3d at 602, 578 P.2d at 914, 146 Cal. Rptr.
at 197.
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"had no intention of completely withdrawing the allocation of loss is-
sue from judicial purview." 137
In contrast, the Alaska Supreme Court in Vertecs found that the
Alaska Contribution Act
represents the legislature's considered policy judgment that concur-
rently negligent tortfeasors should share equally in the loss caused
by their tortious acts. . . .Although pro rata contribution may not
in all cases be the most fair method of loss-shifting, it seems more
fair than the "blunt instrument" of indemnity where all tortfeasors
are to some degree at fault.138
It is now up to the legislature to determine whether its intent has been
accurately construed and whether its 1970 policy judgments are still
valid.
B. Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in Vertecs
In the Vertecs decision, the Alaska Supreme Court balanced pub-
lic policy considerations for and against the implied indemnity doc-
trine. By balancing various concerns, the court implicitly recognized
that neither contribution nor implied indemnity, standing alone, guar-
antees the fairest outcome in many cases. Nevertheless, the court did
not focus on whether or how the two doctrines might coexist.
In order to analyze the merits of implied indemnity and contribu-
tion, it is important to recognize that the fairness of implied indemnity
is crucially affected by the availability of contribution as an alternative
loss-shifting remedy. The relative fairness of contribution and implied
indemnity also varies as the relative fault percentages change. These
interrelationships are best illustrated by considering how the remedies
would affect two tortfeasors, A and B, under two scenarios. First,
consider the case where A's share of the fault for an injury is 5% and
137. Id. at 602, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198. The California Supreme
Court also discussed the provision in its contribution act "which explicitly mandates
that the 'right of contribution shall be administered in accordance with the principles
of equity.'" Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(b)). The court concluded that
"this provision demonstrates that the Legislature did not conceive of its contribution
legislation as a complete and inflexible system for the allocation of loss between multi-
ple tortfeasors." Id. at 602-03, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198 (citations omit-
ted). Without deciding whether this provision would permit judicial alteration of the
pro rata contribution formula, the court stated that the provision "refutes the argu-
ment that the Legislature intended to curtail judicial discretion in apportioning dam-
ages among multiple tortfeasors." Id.
The Alaska Supreme Court, however, interpreted this provision in the Alaska
Statute (ALAsKA STAT. § 09.16.020(3) (1983)) as intended to apply only when one
defendant is insolvent; it was not intended, according to the court, to "affect the re-
quirement that relative degrees of fault are not to be considered as a factor in the
apportionment." Arctic Structures, 605 P.2d at 430-31 (footnote omitted) (relying on
the commissioners' comments interpreting the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act).
138. Vertecs, 661 P.2d at 625-26.
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B's is 95%. 139 Implied indemnity would allow A to shift all of the
damages to B. Pro rata contribution would force each tortfeasor to
bear 50% of the loss. Clearly, implied indemnity would provide a bet-
ter match of liability with fault. A second scenario demonstrates that
implied indemnity becomes less fair as relative percentages of fault be-
came more equal: if A's share of the fault is 40% and B's is 60%, the
pro rata, 50%-50% split is preferable to 0%-100% indemnity.
The expansion of the implied indemnity doctrine has been criti-
cized for creating "confusion and unfairness." 140 The expansion oc-
curred, however, during a period when contribution was unavailable.
It is arguable that because contribution is now available, the standard
for implied indemnity can be considerably more restrictive and con-
crete, allowing courts to apply the doctrine in narrowly defined types
of cases.141 Moreover, if the focus is on fairness, the role for implied
indemnity among concurrently negligent tortfeasors is even more im-
portant where pro rata contribution is the only alternative than where
comparative contribution is available.
A standard which could accommodate both contribution and im-
plied indemnity might be achieved by allowing implied indemnity in-
stead of pro rata contribution only when the results otherwise would
139. This may occur, for example, where A, a retailer, fails to discover a defect in a
product manufactured by B.
140. See Comment, supra note 72, at 400-02.
141. See generally Ferrini, supra note 64, at 268. Ferrini found a meaningful role
for implied indemnity in Illinois, a state in which comparative contribution had been
judicially adopted. He argued that while a tortfeasor who was 1% at fault had a right
to contribution from a tortfeasor who was 99% at fault, indemnity should be permit-
ted when one party's culpability exceeds 99%:
That point is found where the indemnitee is held liable by operation of law
- where the indemnitor owed the indemnitee a duty of care not to expose
the [indemnitee] to liability to a third party and, as a consequence of the
indemnitor's breach of that duty, the indemnitee had been held liable on a
technical basis only.
Id. This standard is essentially the standard for vicarious liability. Ferfini suggests
that once comparative contribution is adopted, implied indemnity should be limited to
cases of vicarious liability, respondeat superior, or similar cases involving pre-tort re-
lationships. Id. In rejecting implied indemnity, the court in Vertecs relied in part on
Comment, supra note 72, at 422, which urged a greater emphasis on contribution than
on active-passive indemnity because South Dakota's contribution statute, based on
relative degrees of fault, is consistent with the tort philosophy of comparative negli-
gence in South Dakota.
The Vertecs court also cited Davis, supra note 132, at 560, which concluded that
"there are legitimate rights of indemnity among negligent concurrent tortfeasors in a
variety of factual situations." Davis proposed that the test for implied indemnity
should be a "disproportionate duty" test. Id. at 546-53. Davis concluded that, "[i]n
order to have a mature, well-rounded law governing relations between negligent
tortfeasors, contribution should be allowed between them in proportion to their rela-
tive fault in cases where indemnity is not proper." Id. at 560.
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be extremely harsh and unfair. A mere claim by one tortfeasor that he
was less at fault than his co-tortfeasors would not suffice. Instead,
implied indemnity could be restricted to specific types of cases in
which the imbalance of fault is severe, for example, "where one
tortfeasor, by his active conduct, has created a danger to the plaintiff,
and the other has merely failed to discover or to remedy it." 142 Just as
Alaska recognizes a right of implied indemnity in cases of respondeat
superior,143 the courts also could recognize the right in favor of a re-
tailer, whose negligence in failing to detect a product defect was only
slight, against the manufacturer who created the dangerous condition.
If the facts of a case were this simple, there would be a clear disparity
in the degree of fault attributable to the retailer and the manufacturer.
Total loss shifting in this case would not be difficult to justify and
arguably would be preferable to pro rata contribution. 144
142. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 51, at 343. This approach - contribution plus a
limited right to implied indemnity - was proposed at the Illinois Judicial Conference
Study Committee on Indemnity, Third Party Actions, and Equitable Contributions:
5(b) Nothing contained in this article shall impair any right of indemnity
or subrogation under existing law except that the right to indemnification of
one personally at fault shall be limited to those circumstances where he
merely fails to discover the dangerous condition created by another.
Ferrini, supra note 64, at 269 (quoting Report of the Study Committee on Indemnity,
Third Party Actions and Equitable Contributions, SR 21, SR 27, SR 28). The com-
mittee's comments explained that this language was intended to limit indemnity "to
its common law uses once [comparative] contribution is accepted as the law ...."
Id. The purpose was to avoid "the results of creative expansion of indemnity by Illi-
nois courts, which the committee believes have developed only in response to the ab-
sence of contribution." Id. The rule could also be applied, as Prosser explains,
against a supplier of goods when a retailer or user of the goods incurs liabil-
ity by reason of negligent reliance upon the supplier's proper care. The same
is true where the owner of a building negligently relies upon a contractor
who makes improvements or repairs. Again, it is quite generally agreed that
there may be indemnity in favor of one who was under only a secondary
duty where another was primarily responsible, as where a municipal corpo-
ration, held liable for failure to keep its streets in safe condition, seeks recov-
ery from the person who has created the condition, or a property owner who
has permitted it; or an owner of land held liable for injury received upon it
sues the wrongdoer who created the hazard.
PROSSER, supra note 16, § 51, at 342-43 (footnotes omitted).
143. See Austin v. Fulton Ins. Co., 498 P.2d 702, 705 (Alaska 1972).
144. See generally O'Donnell, supra note 132, at 287-88. The author contends that
the issues involved in determining an indemnity claim will be argued, for example as
defenses, in the plaintiff's case anyway. O'Donnell concludes that even if indemnity
would add a slight burden to the judge or jury it is justified. "[The] sacrifice of fair-
ness to the individual litigant would be a high price for what would often be a slight
saving of judicial time." Id. at 287; see also Ferrini, supra note 64, at 268 (urging the
continued vitality of indemnity, at least in its traditional form (applying in cases of
pre-tort relationship) as part of a flexible and equitable system of comparative contri-
bution and implied indemnity).
Other cases in which denying indemnity may be extremely harsh and unfair are
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Unfortunately, the over-simplified example of the retailer is mis-
leading. Defining clear standards for implied indemnity has proven
extremely difficult and has resulted in a variety of vague formula-
tions.145 The Alaska Supreme Court's rejection of the implied indem-
nity doctrine in Vertecs was motivated in part by the difficulties it saw
in determining the boundaries of a narrow category of slightly negli-
gent tortfeasors. 146 Furthermore, the case by case development of the
doctrine would be slow in producing a body of predictable authority.
Numerous cross-claims and third party claims could be expected, and
the volume and cost of litigation based on implied indemnity theories
would increase.' 47
In addition, as the Vertecs court noted,148 adoption of implied in-
demnity could discourage settlements. When pro rata contribution af-
fords the sole method of loss allocation, a good-faith settlement ends
the litigation for the settling party by barring later contribution claims
against him. 149 Indemnity rights, however, are unaffected by settle-
ment under the statute. 50 Thus, if implied indemnity were available,
settlement would not guarantee a discharge from liability for a settling
party in all cases; a slightly negligent tortfeasor could not sue for con-
tribution, but may sue for implied indemnity. This might reduce the
attractiveness of settlement as a strategy.' 51 Nevertheless, it is the
greatly blameworthy tortfeasor - the potential indemnitor - whose
settlement is discouraged by the availability of implied indemnity, be-
cause a slightly blameworthy tortfeasor would not be sued for
indemnity.
where the statute of limitations has run on the contribution claim, see ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.16.030(d) (1983), or culpable parties are not subject to service of process, forcing
one tortfeasor to bear the entire loss.
145. See Vertecs, 661 P.2d at 624.
146. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
147. The projected increase in the volume of litigation may be viewed as a conse-
quence of discouraging settlement.
148. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
149. ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.040(2) (1983).
150. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010(f) (1983).
151. This uncertainty could be avoided by discharging a settling tortfeasor from
liability for implied indemnity as well as contribution. This approach was recently
adopted by statute in Missouri:
When an agreement by release, covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judg-
ment is given in good faith .... [it] shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom
it is given from all liability for contribution or non-contractual indemnity to
any other tortfeasor. The term "non-contractual indemnity" as used in this
section refers to indemnity between joint tortfeasors culpably negligent, hav-
ing no legal relationship to each other and does not include indemnity which
comes about by reason of contract, or by reason of vicarious liability.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (Vernon Supp. 1984). See generally Fischer, supra note
53.
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The dynamics of the settlement process are illustrated, albeit sim-
plistically, in the following hypothetical case. Assume that P sues D1
and D2 for negligence, seeking $100,000 in damages. Assume further
that Dl is 90% at fault for manufacturing a defective product, and D2
is 10% at fault for failing to discover the defect. Implied indemnity, if
permitted, would allow D2 to shift his entire loss to D1 for breach of
implied warranty. This creates a disincentive for D1 to settle because,
although the settlement would discharge his potential liability to D2
for pro rata contribution,15 2 it would not discharge his potential liabil-
ity for indemnity to D2, if D2 had to pay p.153
The same case comes out differently when indemnity is unavaila-
ble pursuant to the Vertecs rule. D1 is able to offer P a settlement
without the risk of subsequent liability to D2. If settlement were
achieved between D1 and P, and D2 were not involved in the settle-
ment, D2 would be liable either for contribution to D1 (if D1 paid the
entire damages and obtained a release of D2),154 or for damages to P
for the unrecovered amount of P's loss. Moreover, Dl has some in-
centive to avoid litigation with D2, because if D1 merely obtained a
release for D2, D2 could raise a defense of nonnegligence. Such a de-
152. ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.040(2) (1983).
153. Id. § 09.16.010(f).
154. Id. § 09.16.010(b),(d). In Criterion Ins. Co. v. Laitala, 658 P.2d 112, 116-17
(Alaska 1983) (distinguishing Young v. State, 455 P.2d 889, 893 (Alaska 1969)), the
court held that a post-judgment settlement between a tortfeasor's insurer (Criterion)
and an injured party discharged another tortfeasor (Laitala) from liability to the in-
jured party even though Laitala was not specifically named in the release. The court
reasoned that because the statute of limitations had run on any claims by the injured
party against Laitala, the general release in effect discharged Laitala under Alaska
Statutes section 09.16.010 (d) (barring a settling tortfeasor's contribution action unless
the settlement extinguishes the non-settling tortfeasor's liability), and Laitala was lia-
ble for contribution to Criterion. Id.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Rabinowitz argued that precisely because the
statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff's claims against Laitala, the release could
not have discharged Laitala in any real sense. Id. at 118. Justice Rabinowitz noted
that section 09.16.010 (d) "was intended only to protect a non-discharged tortfeasor
.. . from being sued by both the settling tortfeasor and the injured party." Id. (foot-
note omitted). Thus, that section does not apply where the non-discharged tortfeasor
is protected by the statute of limitations. Id. Nevertheless, even Justice Rabinowitz
agreed that Laitala was liable for contribution because Criterion's contribution action
was timely. Id. at 114 n.3, 118.
Justice Rabinowitz suggested that the plaintiff and Criterion probably did not
consider Laitala when they settled because Laitala was protected by the statute of
limitations. Id. at 118 n. 1. However, the statute of limitations did not protect Laitala
from a contribution action by Criterion; thus, in settling, Criterion may have contem-
plated a later suit against Laitala for contribution. Although a full discussion of the
ramifications of Laitala is beyond the scope of this note, it is important to note that
the supreme court will treat a tortfeasor as discharged with respect to the plaintiff
under section 09.16.010 (d), for purposes of contribution liability, if the statute of
limitations has run on the plaintiff's claims against him.
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fense might be attractive to a sympathetic jury whose only other op-
tion would be forcing D2, who was only 10% at fault, to bear 50% of
the loss.155 Thus, the pro rata system might induce a highly culpable
party to offer to pay more than a pro rata share of the damages in
order to bring a slightly culpable party into the settlement process.
In sum, it is difficult to balance fairness and efficiency in Alaska's
current tort loss allocation system. If the supreme court had adopted
implied indemnity among joint tortfeasors, the resulting system would
still strike only a rough balance. Therefore, other approaches should
be considered.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO TORT Loss ALLOCATION
AMONG CONCURRENTLY NEGLIGENT TORTFEASORS:
MATCHING LIABILITY WITH FAULT
A. Matching Liability with Relative Fault
The Alaska Supreme Court has considered several alternative sys-
tems of tort loss allocation. The system approved in Vertecs forces
concurrently negligent tortfeasors to share the loss equally.' 56 The
Vertecs court rejected an alternative system that would split
155. D2, only 10% negligent, may be in a good position to appeal to the jury's
sense of fairness if the jury understands that under the pro rata system D2 will pay
either 50% of the damages, if D2 is found to be negligent, or none, if D2 is found not
to be negligent. Jury confusion over this issue is demonstrated in In re Barrow Air
Crash, No. 3AN-81-2321 Civ. (Alaska filed Oct 13, 1978). The plaintiff and each of
two defendants were negligent in causing plaintiff's injuries. In accordance with the
rule of comparative negligence, the jury instructions and verdict form required the
jury to determine the relative percentages of fault between the plaintiff on one line and
the defendants, as a group, on another line. The jury sent a note to the judge asking
whether there should be three lines for percentages of fault, one each for the plaintiff,
the first defendant, and the second defendant. After being instructed that they should
simply subtract the plaintiff's percentage from 100% to find the defendants' percent-
age, the jury sent another note to the judge:
Are you saying we may not assign separate percentages to [defendant]
Ehredt and [defendant] DeHavilland? We want to assign each party, Le.,
[plaintiff] Walters, Ehredt, and DeHavilland, the % we feel applies to each
specific party.
(Transcript 3002-03). The judge refused to explain to the jury that relative fault
among defendants was irrelevant and that no relative fault apportionment would oc-
cur. He sent a verdict to the jury with separate lines for percentages of fault for each
of the three parties. The jury found the plaintiff 10% at fault, the first defendant 75%
at fault, and the second defendant 15% at fault. The jurors later learned that the
defendants would split the liability equally. Several jurors expressed their disappoint-
ment to the judge and indicated that the verdict might have come out differently had
they known how the pro rata contribution system worked. Appellant's Opening Brief
at 11-17, In re Barrow Air Crash.
156. The system of tort loss allocation in Alaska after Vertecs is pro rata contribu-
tion and no implied indemnity among currently negligent tortfeasors. See Vertecs
Corp. v. Reichhold Chem. Corp., Inc., 661 P.2d 619, 625-26 (Alaska 1983).
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tortfeasors into two categories - those who should share equally in
the loss and those whose minimal degree of negligence entitles them to
shift the loss entirely.1 -7 Another alternative, which was not seriously
considered by the court in Vertecs or in Arctic Structures, is a system
of partial indemnity in which each tortfeasor's share of the loss is pro-
portionate to his degree of fault. 158
This last alternative - matching liability with relative fault - is
the tort loss allocation system most consistent with the comparative
negligence system employed in Alaska.159 Under comparative negli-
gence, juries may consider the relative fault of the plaintiff and defend-
ant in determining the plaintiff's maximum recovery. Consider a
hypothetical case in which plaintiff (P) is found to be 10% at fault and
the defendants 90% at fault in causing a $100,000 loss to P. The old
contributory negligence rule would have barred P's suit altogether.
The comparative negligence rule permits P to recover $90,000 from
the defendants. As the Alaska Supreme Court noted: "The basic ob-jection to [contributory negligence] - grounded in the primal concept
that in a system in which liability is based on fault, the extent of fault
should govern the extent of liability - remains irresistible to reason
and all intelligent notions of fairness."' 160
The fundamental principle of fairness that supports the compara-
tive negligence system also strongly supports the adoption of implied
partial indemnity or comparative contribution for fault-based loss allo-
cation among concurrently negligent defendants.161 For example,
157. A system dividing tortfeasors into two categories would result where pro rata
contribution applies to all concurrently negligent tortfeasors except those determined
to be non-participating, passive, or secondary. These tortfeasors would be entitled to
indemnity.
158. Partial indemnity and comparative contribution are identical in outcome. Im-
plied partial indemnity is used by some courts to accomplish apportionment based on
relative fault where no statutory scheme accomplishes this. See generally Comment,
supra note 32, at 130-44.
159. Both implied partial indemnity and comparative negligence apportion loss
among defendant tortfeasors according to their relative degrees of fault. Apportion-
ment by fault parallels the notion of comparative negligence and should be adopted in
comparative negligence jurisdictions. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12
U.L.A. Supp. 39, 40 commissioners' prefatory note (1985). Once a jury has appor-
tioned fault in a plaintiff's action under the comparative negligence rule, it is intui-
tively unfair to require pro rata contribution among defendants. See supra note 155.
160. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1048 (quoting Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 810, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-31, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 862 (1975) (footnotes omitted)).
The court also quoted the following strong language from Li: "The essence of that
criticism [of contributory negligence] has been constant and clear: the doctrine is
inequitable in its operation because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion to
fault. Against this have been raised several arguments in justification, but none have
proved even remotely adequate to the task." Id.
161. Cf Sowle & Conkle, Comparative Negligence Versus the Constitutional Guar-
[Vol. 2:127
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under the current rule of pro rata contribution, if D1 and D2 were
concurrently negligent defendants, they each would be liable under
pro rata contribution for 50% of the judgment. Under a relative fault
system, if a jury found D1 to be 90% at fault and D2 10% at fault, D1
would be liable for 90% and D2 for 10% of the damages awarded to
the plaintiff. In deciding whether to settle, the defendants would esti-
mate relative degrees of fault. Their estimates and presumably their
settlements would more closely reflect actual culpability if litigation
were expected to result in apportionment according to fault.
A recent trend toward more equitable treatment of concurrent
tortfeasors is evident. 162 The first step toward embracing this trend in
antee of Equal Protection: A Hypothetical Judicial Decision, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1083,
1124-33 (presenting a constitutional argument that there is no legally significant differ-
ence between a negligent plaintiff and a negligent defendant, each seeking to share a
tort loss; there is no legitimate and meaningful government interest in treating the two
categories differently; and the plaintiff-defendant allocation rules should match the
defendant-defendant allocation rules).
162. See Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1049. Apportioning loss among wrongdoers based
upon relative fault appears to represent the modem wisdom in this area of jurispru-
dence. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 51, at 344-45. The Prosser treatise recognizes that
changes in the law of contribution and relative fault will make courts reconsider in-
demnity rules. Now that the choice is no longer between the two stiff alternatives of
pro rata contribution and total loss-shifting indemnity, comparative fault modifica-
tions have begun and can be expected to continue. Confusion over labels should not
discourage attempts to modify the law. Id. at 344; see Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1047 (recog-
nizing the trend in the majority of American jurisdictions toward comparative fault
systems); UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT, 12 U.L.A. Supp. 39 commissioners'
prefatory note (1985); Ferrini, supra note 64, at 258, 260. See generally Comment,
supra note 43; Williams & Davidson, supra note 43, at 175-76.
In Vertecs the Alaska Supreme Court relied in part on American Motorcycle
Ass'n, Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978),
for its statement that the doctrine of implied indemnity has left indemnity jurispru-
dence in disarray. See Vertecs, 661 P.2d at 624 n.12. In American Motorcycle Ass'n,
the California court avoided potential problems resulting from vague standards for
"active-passive" indemnity by permitting implied partial indemnity. See American
Motorcycle Ass'n, 20 Cal. 3d at 595, 608, 578 P.2d at 910, 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 191,
199. The development of implied partial indemnity in California demonstrates two
important points. First, the new doctrine highlights the current movement toward the
development of equitable loss-shifting among wrongdoers. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 70, §§ 301-05 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) (codifying comparative contribution -
shifting loss according to relative degrees of fault - two years after the Illinois
Supreme Court judicially created that right in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Packing
Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 439 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied,
436 U.S. 946 (1978)); Comment, supra note 43, at 173.
Initially, indemnity jurisprudence was expanded to promote the goal of requiring
each tortfeasor to bear the burden of the loss commensurate with his culpability.
Later, courts and legislatures softened the harsh effects of all-or-nothing loss shifting
by adopting comparative negligence. Comparative contribution is the next logical link
in the evolution of these remedies. The Alaska Supreme Court joined this movement
by judicially creating comparative negligence and noting that it requires amendment
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Alaska was perhaps the supreme court's statement in Kaatz that it is
willing to accept jury verdicts apportioning fault, even though not
"precisely scientific," in order to avoid the harshness of contributory
negligence.163 The judicial efficiency and vagueness arguments ad-
vanced by opponents of comparative negligence were rejected by the
court in Kaatz:
Judicial administration of the [comparative negligence] rule has not
presented insuperable difficulties in those jurisdictions which have
long employed it. Experience has not borne out the argument that
comparative negligence is difficult for courts and juries to apply.
Similarly, careful studies tend to show that settlement of cases
can be achieved as readily under the comparative negligence system
as under the contributory negligence rule. 164
The supreme court has indicated the importance of altering the unfair
rule of statutory pro rata contribution in Alaska. 165 In State v.
Guinn, 166 decided one year after the court adopted comparative negli-
gence, the court said in. a footnote: "We are cognizant that this court's
adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence in Kaatz v. State
will require amendment of Alaska's Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act." 167 Similarly, in Vertecs, the Alaska Supreme Court
recognized that "pro rata contribution may not in all cases be the most
fair method of loss-shifting .. 168
The Alaska Supreme Court could have taken the initiative and
adopted implied partial indemnity.' 69 Judicial action in the face of
legislative silence or indecision in the field of loss allocation is not new
of Alaska's Contribution Act. See State v. Guinn, 555 P.2d 530, 547 n.42 (Alaska
1976).
The second point highlighted by the development of implied partial indemnity is
the crucial role the judiciary has played in the development of equitable loss shifting.
In New York, for example, the judicial adoption of the implied partial indemnity
doctrine was followed by legislative enactment of a comparative contribution statute
two years later. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §§ 1401-04 (McKinney 1976). The same
process occurred in Illinois. See Comment, supra note 43, at 173. The Alaska
Supreme Court has performed an equally significant role in the field of loss allocation.
Alaska is one of a few states where the old contributory negligence rule was replaced
by the judiciary with comparative negligence. The Kaatz decision was a judicial re-
sponse to nine years of legislative indecision. See infra note 170 and accompanying
text.
163. Kaat, 540 P.2d at 1048. Juries may naturally want to apportion damages in
cases of great disparity of fault. See supra note 155.
164. Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1048 (footnote omitted).
165. Guinn, 555 P.2d at 547 n.42; see also Arctic Structures, 605 P.2d at 435 n.29.
166. 555 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976).
167. Id. at 547 n.42 (citations omitted).
168. Vertecs, 661 P.2d at 625.
169. It has been noted recently that courts have more flexibility to modify common
law indemnity than they do to modify statutory pro rata contribution; nevertheless,
the respective role of the legislature should be considered. See PROSSER, supra note
[Vol. 2:127
COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION
in Alaska. The judicial adoption of comparative negligence in Kaatz
occurred nine years after the legislature first considered, but failed to
enact, a bill to adopt comparative negligence. 170 At the time Kaatz
was decided, at least twenty-six states had enacted comparative negli-
gence statutes, but only three states, including Alaska, had judicially
adopted the doctrine. 171 In contrast, the Alaska Supreme Court took
a passive role in 1979 when it "considered and reject[ed] judicial crea-
tion of a partial indemnity rule of law," without ever discussing the
doctrine in its opinion. 72 Similarly, the decision in Vertecs demon-
strates that the Alaska Supreme Court is reluctant to intrude on the
legislative role.
Clearly, the court believes that adopting implied indemnity would
offend the policies of the Contribution Act. Thus, the court would
almost certainly believe that adopting implied partial indemnity would
be a far greater intrusion on the statutory pro rata mechanism, be-
cause implied partial indemnity would replace statutory contribution
rather than supplement it in certain cases. Therefore, it is unlikely
that the court will reconsider its rejection of implied partial indemnity
in light of the decision in Vertecs.
B. Suggested Legislative Amendments to the Contribution Act to
Permit Comparative Contribution
It is time for the Alaska legislature to replace its rigid pro rata
contribution rule with the comparative fault provision proposed by the
House Judiciary Committee in -1970.173 States that have adopted a
comparative fault system for plaintiffs, as Alaska did in Kaatz, should
also adopt a comparative fault system for defendants. 174 The Alaska
legislature could accept the judicial invitations and enact comparative
contribution by simply amending the Contribution Act provision that
provides: "in determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the en-
16, § 51, at 344; see also id. § 3, at 20 (at least one current commentator believes
courts should be more active in re-examining outmoded statutes).
170. For a brief recount of the unsuccessful attempts to pass comparative negli-
gence legislation in Alaska, see Williams & Davidson, supra note 43, at 175 n.5.
171. See id. at 175 & nn.2-4.
172. Arctic Structures, 605 P.2d at 435 n.27.
173. See Heft, Spreading the Burden: The Better Way to Accomplish Contribution
Is by Comparative Negligence, 22 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 37 (Summer 1972) (urging
the adoption of comparative contribution and offering practical suggestions for attor-
neys who may later work with the doctrine); Note, Reconciling Comparative Negli-
gence, Contribution, and Joint and Several Liability, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1159
(1977) (urging the adoption of comparative contribution); see also supra note 50.
174. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. Supp. 39, 40 commis-
sioners' prefatory note (1985) (suggesting the enactment of a comparative contribution
statute).
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tire liability . . . their relative degrees of fault shall not be consid-
ered."1 75 The amendment should allow consideration of relative fault.
For clarity, the statute should also be amended by replacing the phrase
"pro rata share" with "equitable share" wherever it appears in the
Contribution Act.
In 1983, the Alaska Supreme Court recommended an amendment
along these lines:
We question whether the rule [prohibiting consideration of relative
fault] "distribute[s] the responsibility equitably among those who
are jointly liable." . . . While the question of whether the Act
should be amended is a matter committed to the judgment of the
legislature, it is our view that where one joint tortfeasor seeks con-
tribution from another, the tortfeasor's "pro rata share" should
mean a share proportionate to his comparative fault. We add that
such a rule would not undermine the rule of joint and several liabil-
ity announced in Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore. We invite leg-
islative consideration of this aspect of the Act.176
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA) would provide gui-
dance to those drafting an amendment to the Contribution Act.177
The UCFA is the most recent product of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, approved in 1977, and is ex-
pressly intended to replace the 1955 pro rata Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act in those states that have adopted comparative
negligence.178 The UCFA requires that percentages of fault be estab-
lished for each party in an action, including a plaintiff who is contribu-
torily at fault. 179 The basis for contribution is each party's established
equitable share, determined by considering relative degrees of fault in
light of the nature of the conduct and its causal relationship to the
damages.180 Joint and several liability is retained, but reallocation of
uncollectible shares occurs among all negligent parties, including neg-
ligent plaintiffs. 181
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrines of implied indemnity and contribution were devel-
oped to remove common law obstacles to the fair allocation of tort
loss. Alaska's tort loss allocation system is gradually advancing to-
ward the goal of fairness, paralleling the increasing confidence in the
judicial system's ability to apportion fault accurately and efficiently.
175. ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.020 (1983).
176. Criterion Ins. Co. v. Laitala, 658 P.2d 112, 118 n. 11 (Alaska 1983) (citation
omitted).
177. See 12 U.L.A. Supp. 39 (1985).
178. Id. at 40 commissioners' prefatory note.
179. Id. § 2(a), at 43.
180. Id. § 2(b); see id. at 43-44 commissioners' comment (listing circumstances rel-
evant to determining relative fault).
181. Id. § 2(a)(2); see id. at 44 commissioners' comment.
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The Alaska Supreme Court has participated in this development, most
notably by adopting comparative negligence. Nonetheless, the court
has clearly signalled its view that further improvement in this field
requires the combined effort of the judiciary and the legislature.
The Alaska Supreme Court made it clear that, in light of the fact
that the legislature chose and has left intact an equal sharing mecha-
nism, the court will not impose on the legislature the court's view that
contribution should be apportioned according to fault. As matters
now stand, therefore, Alaska's tort loss allocation system forces joint
tortfeasors to share losses equally regardless of their relative degrees of
fault. Given the court's adherence to the statutory rule of pro rata
contribution, its conclusion in Vertecs that adopting implied indemnity
would create more uncertainty than it would resolve was correct.
Rather than add a vague doctrine, Alaska should modernize its cur-
rent rules to accomplish their intended result. The tradeoff between
fairness and efficiency is unnecessary. The conflict should be resolved
by amending the Contribution Act to permit comparative contribu-
tion. This legislative action would implement a tort loss allocation
system that matches each party's liability with the percentage of dam-
age for which he is responsible.
David Edward Mills
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